No welfare magnets – free movement and cross-border welfare in Germany and Denmark compared by Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg & Werner, Benjamin
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
No welfare magnets – free movement and cross-border welfare in Germany and
Denmark compared
Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg; Werner, Benjamin
Published in:







Citation for published version (APA):
Martinsen, D. S., & Werner, B. (2019). No welfare magnets – free movement and cross-border welfare in
Germany and Denmark compared. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(5), 637-655.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1481136
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
1 

No welfare magnets – free movement and cross-border welfare in Germany 
and Denmark compared 
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
Benjamin Werner 
Institute for Intercultural and International Studies, University of Bremen, Germany 




A ‘dually open’ free movement system has evolved in the European Union (EU), granting EU 
citizens the right to free movement within the Union as well as cross-border welfare rights. 
Some scholarly literature and public debates have characterized the system as corrosive to the 
nationally organized welfare state, which will become a ‘magnet’ for the European poor. This 
paper examines how the German and Danish welfare states have responded to the ‘dual open’ 
system and its outcomes in terms of EU citizens’ take-up rate of non-contributory benefits 
between 2007 and 2015. We show that the domestic responses were mostly restrictive and 
that outcomes remained rather stable. Our findings do not support the welfare magnet thesis 
but instead identify a tendency to a bifurcated social protection system for EU citizens in 
Germany.  
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Over the last decades, European Union (EU) legislation and case law from the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) have created a free movement regime in which EU citizens not only 
enjoy the right to freely move and reside within the Union’s territory but also have, subject to 
certain limitations, access to the welfare system of their host member state.
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The formation of such a ‘dually open’ free movement system has evoked considerable 
concerns in EU member states about welfare-motivated migration, portraying the welfare 
state as vulnerable to people on the move (Ruhs 2015; Hassel, Steen Knudsen, and Wagner 
2016; Martinsen and Pons Rotger 2017; Blauberger et. al. 2018). In particular, the grand EU 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007 as well as expansive EU law have been regarded as increasing 
the likelihood of European welfare migration. The addition of ten eastern European member 
states led to an unprecedented increase in the socio-economic heterogeneity of the 
community. Theories of welfare magnetism assume that such heterogeneity would motivate a 
West-facing movement and, in particular, render more generous, non-contributory welfare 
states attractive residential choices.  
However, despite fears and theoretically supported concerns, studies of national responses to 
and outcomes of EU rules and litigation are lacking. In the following, we attempt to fill this 
research gap by examining how Germany and Denmark responded to the dually open free 
movement system in the EU and the outcomes thereof. The German and the Danish cases 
have been chosen because they represent different welfare state types and thus differ in the 
extent to which they presumably constitute ‘welfare attractions’. A ‘welfare magnet’ effect 
does not challenge all EU member states to the same extent. Rather, the level of generosity of 
welfare benefits (less vs. more generous) and the dominant mode of financing the welfare 
state (non-contributory vs. contributory) matter regarding which state is more attractive. The 
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theoretical assumption of welfare magnetism states that immigrants’ location choices are 
influenced by the dispersion in states’ welfare benefits (Borjas 1999). As further detailed 
below, the Danish tax-financed, universalistic welfare state constitutes a more likely case that 
confirms the welfare magnet thesis than the insurance-based German welfare state.  
With respect to other key parameters that are likely to matter for responses and outcomes, the 
two countries differ as starkly as they do in welfare terms. Denmark and Germany have quite 
different legal systems and cultures. Compared to other EU member states, German legal 
culture is highly legalistic, often using litigation to clarify rules and solve disputes (Conant 
2002; Warden 2009). Germany has specialized social courts at the local, regional and federal 
levels, whereas Denmark has no social courts (Martinsen 2005). Instead, Denmark has an 
administrative, quasi-judicial social board of appeal (ankestyrelsen). In relation to EU law, 
German courts have been among the most frequent referrers of preliminary references to the 
ECJ in general, particularly regarding social law, whereas Danish courts have engaged the 
supranational court much less frequently (Martinsen 2005; Wind et. al 2009). This difference 
has partly been explained by different democratic traditions. The German constitutional 
democracy relies on a much stronger role of judicial review than the majoritarian democracy 
in Denmark, where the chief doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty leaves less room for 
activist courts (Wind et. al. 2009). In terms of the labour market, Germany has undergone a 
‘dualization’ between insiders and outsiders over the last decades, implying increased 
‘bifurcation’ between the core workforce and those employed in the low wage sectors with a 
growing number of workers with atypical and irregular jobs (Thelen 2014). In contrast to 
Denmark, Germany has become ‘a destination country for low wage work’ (Hassel, Steen 
Knudsen, and Wagner 2016, 1218). The income of the ‘working-poor’ is supplemented by in-
work benefits. In this regard the income package in Germany is rather similar to the UK, 
combining low wages with benefit top-ups (Vandenbroucke 2016). In contrast, the Danish 
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labour market model has kept wages relatively high, and welfare schemes do not provide 
income support to low-paid work.  
Below, we present the theoretical assumptions underlying welfare magnetism. We then 
present the socio-economic heterogeneity in EU-27, focusing on the welfare state types of 
Germany and Denmark. The analysis proceeds by first examining the judicial, administrative 
and political responses to the ‘dually open’ free movement system in the two countries from 
2004 to the present, focusing on child benefits, guaranteed minimum benefits and study grants 
and then comparing national data on EU citizens’ actual consumption of these benefits 
between 2007 and 2015.
2
 The final section concludes.  
On Welfare Magnetism 
In the European Union, free movement of persons and their right to cross-border welfare are 
argued to constitute a particular challenge to the sustainability of the welfare state. The rights 
of EU citizens to move, reside, take work and become members of national welfare 
communities clash with the traditional boundaries of the welfare state, which was developed 
to protect the interests and the welfare of a nation’s own citizens. In the political and public 
debate, the relationship between EU migration and the welfare state has taken centre stage. 
The normative justification and fiscal sustainability of the EU’s cross-border welfare rights 
have undergone increasing politicisation in various member states, with ‘social’ or ‘welfare 
tourism’ becoming a common narrative (Blauberger et. al. 2018).  
The core assumption of ‘welfare magnetism’ is that the generosity of welfare programmes 
affects the residential choices of migrants. ‘Welfare magnetism’ became a key topic in the late 
1990s in the US social science literature. Federal welfare reforms around that time provided 
US states with more autonomy in establishing the eligibility requirements of welfare 
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provisions and initially resulted in more heterogeneous reactions by state governments to 
immigrants’ welfare rights (Kaushal 2005). The reforms gave rise to various studies 
examining the welfare-induced behaviour of both national migration between US states 
(Peterson and Rom 2010; Kaushal 2005) and immigrants’ inter-state residential choices when 
arriving in the US (Borjas 1999). The welfare magnet hypothesis posits that states with more 
generous welfare policies attract immigrants with a high preference for welfare benefits 
(Borjas 1999).  
Applying the welfare magnet hypothesis to the EU, the assumption is that welfare-motivated 
migration results in mobility from the newer and poorer member states in Eastern Europe to 
the older and richer member states in Western Europe that have more generous welfare states 
(Kvist 2004; De Giorgi and Pellizzari 2009). The level of social protection and the extent of 
social services as well as modes of financing welfare should affect migrants’ residential 
choices and thus make some welfare states particularly challenged. Some papers point to 
social market economies, particularly the tax-financed welfare state (Ruhs 2015), as more 
challenged by EU free movement principles than liberal market economies (Scharpf 2010; 
Höpner and Schäfer 2012). 
‘Welfare magnetism’ also suggests states’ limited capacity to respond to and control welfare-
motivated migration, since courts may draw constitutional limits to the discriminatory 
practices adopted by states. The European integration literature emphasizes that member 
states have lost their ability to respond to and control unintended access to welfare benefits. 
Free movement principles are constitutive parts of the internal market and take primacy over 
national law and policy. For decades, European legislators and the ECJ have extended the 
rights to free movement and cross-border welfare in the EU. In particular, judicial decision-
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making has been noted as corrosive to national welfare autonomy, reducing the range of 
policy options available. 
However, research on compliance with and implementation of EU law and policy notes that 
member states are not simple adopters of EU law and policy but rather that domestic 
responses affect the further processing of EU obligations (Conant 2002; Dimitrova and 
Steunenberg 2016; Heindlmaier and Blauberger 2017). Member states may engage in 
strategic responses to EU law (Kvist 2004) and thus create a parallel or alternative range of 
policy options. Such alternative policy options may be identifiable when studying the judicial, 
administrative and political responses to EU social integration in which domestic actors 
engage. For our analytical purposes, judicial responses involve the ways in which national 
courts make use of ECJ decisions and EU law in national legal proceedings. Political 
responses concern the strategic or ideological actions in which national politicians engage 
when adopting national laws, decrees or instructions that apply EU law. Finally, 
administrative responses represent the ways in which civil servants implement EU rules. 
Socio-Economic Heterogeneity in the European Union Compared  
With the dually open free movement system in the European Union, a Union citizen is 
granted a freer residential choice based on his or her individual decision. However, individual 
decisions are shaped to a great extent by regional socio-economic differences in both the 
home and hosting member states (Bruzelius, Reinprecht, and SeeleibKaiser 2017). As Table 
1 demonstrates, these differences are vast among EU member states. 
[Table 1 here] 
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The first column lists the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2015 according to the 
purchasing power standard (PPS) for the EU-27 member states as a percentage of the EU-27 
average (EU-27 = 100) to capture differences in economic power and prosperity. The second 
and third columns of Table 1 demonstrate that there are also stark differences in the extent to 
which national wealth is used for social protection and how this protection is organized and 
financed. Whereas in 2015 the old, north-western member states spent on average 
approximately 27 percent of their annual GDP on social protection, the welfare expenditures 
of the Eastern member states were on average one-third lower (mean of 17.6 percent). In 
addition, whereas Denmark’s more generous welfare state (social protection as 31.1 percent 
of GDP) was largely tax-financed, with only 18 percent of social protection financed by 
contributions, almost 80 percent of Estonia’s much smaller welfare expenditures were 
financed by contributions. 
This socio-economic heterogeneity within the EU demonstrates that if welfare-induced 
migration occurs within the EU, it will largely be a movement from East to West, namely, 
from new to old member states. However, if welfare magnetism occurs as theoretically 
predicted, the welfare institutional differences between Germany and Denmark would also 
matter to the residential choices of EU migrants.  
Two Welfare States Compared: Germany and Denmark 
Although the north-western member states would be the main target of ‘welfare migration’, 
they would also, given their differences in organizing and financing social protection, be 
affected to different degrees. The German welfare state belongs to the social insurance, 
‘conservative’ welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) and is therefore presumably less 
vulnerable to welfare-motivated migration since entitlement to most welfare benefits requires 
prior contribution. Such a system should be relatively unattractive to welfare-motivated 
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migration since both access to and the size of benefits crucially depend on prior work 
performance. In contrast, the Danish welfare state belongs to the tax-financed, Nordic or 
‘social democratic’ model (Ibid.). In this type of welfare state, there is no direct link between 
contributions and entitlements for most benefits. Tax-financed welfare benefits are available 
without having previously paid social security contributions and are typically granted on the 
basis of legal residence. 
Moving beyond the typological distinction of welfare states and into the actual institutional 
schemes, insurance-based welfare states also operate non-contributory, residence-based and 
means-tested benefits to protect those who are outside of the labour market and, therefore, 
have no access to contribution-based benefits.  In Germany, the most important schemes in 
this regard are (1) minimum income benefits for persons whose income falls below the ‘socio-
cultural subsistence level’. These benefits are available for a) unemployed persons capable of 
working (Arbeitslosengeld (ALG) II); b) employed persons with non-sufficient income (ALG 
II as in-work benefit, i.e., a form of income support); and c) persons incapable of working, 
with reduced earnings capacity or of old age (Sozialhilfe). Additional schemes are (2) child 
allowances for persons with children (Kindergeld) and (3) financial support for students 
(BAföG). Kindergeld is a universal benefit, whereas financial support for students is a means-
tested benefit for students with low-income parents or insufficient personal means.  
Turning to Denmark, we find the highest share of non-contributory benefits and the second-
highest social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP among EU member states, 
surpassed only by France. The main Danish welfare benefits are tax-financed and provide 
universal coverage. Denmark operates similar non-contributory schemes as Germany; child 
benefits (børne- og ungeydelse), social assistance (kontanthjælp) and study grants (Statens 
Uddannelsesstøtte). However, important differences should be noted. Denmark has no in-
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work benefits, and there are no public benefit supplements for low-paid jobs. It should also be 
noted that the Danish study grant is universally given to all students enrolled in higher 
education. The study grant is independent of parental income. A student can obtain additional 
state-granted loans and additionally work a limited amount of hours. 
Table 2 compares the ‘generosity’ level, i.e., the monthly allowances of the three non-
contributory benefits. We observe in particular that the Danish minimum income benefits are 
notably higher than the German benefits and that the Danish study grants are somewhat 
higher than the German means-tested financial support for students, whereas child benefits are 
slightly more generous in Germany than in Denmark. 
[Table 2 here] 
With respect to the welfare magnet theory, these institutional differences influence 
immigrants’ residential choices (Borjas 1999). Empirically, the welfare-magnetic assumption 
would be supported 1) if we found a higher take-up rate of residing EU citizens of the 
examined benefits in Denmark than in Germany and 2) if we found an increase over time in 
the take-up rate of residing EU citizens of the examined benefits within the two countries. The 
take-up rate denotes the proportion of residing EU citizens receiving a specific benefit in a 
given year.  
National Responses to EU Law  
In this section, we compare how Germany and Denmark responded to the EU’s dually open 
free movement system in judicial, political and administrative terms with respect to the 
extended access of EU citizens to non-contributory benefits. 
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German Responses  
Although Germany’s tax-financed benefit schemes have always been subject to a residence 
principle alone (i.e., every person residing legally in Germany is, irrespective of his or her 
nationality, eligible for these benefits), there were always important exceptions to this general 
rule for EU nationals (and other foreigners) that were explicitly introduced to prevent welfare-
motivated migration. More specifically, this meant that EU citizens who had a right to reside 
but never worked in Germany (jobseekers and economically non-active persons, such as 
pensioners or students) were not able to access minimum income benefits. Additionally, 
students with EU nationality were eligible for study grants only if they had a permanent 
residence right. The only non-contributory benefit EU nationals could claim was the child 
allowance since this required no more than a German address or a German tax ID number. 
Therefore, when, in the mid-2000s the combination of EU enlargement and expansive EU law 
increased the perceived likelihood of a European ‘welfare migration’ scenario, Germany 
already had measures in place to ‘demagnetize’ its tax-financed welfare schemes. 
However, German courts regarded some of these measures as unlawful and therefore allowed 
for EU nationals’ access to non-contributory benefits. For example, German social courts 
doubted that the exclusion of EU jobseekers from ALG II was consistent with European law. 
In 2007, the social court of Nuremberg asked the ECJ for legal guidance on this issue via a 
preliminary ruling request. However, the ECJ’s answer did not bring the desired clarity. In its 
Vatsouras decision (C-22/08), the Court ruled that member states are allowed to deny EU 
jobseekers social assistance but not benefits that aim to bring people into work. However, the 
decision regarding whether ALG II is of the former or the latter nature was explicitly left to 
the German authorities, and the restriction was thus upheld. However, the German social 
courts continued to dispute the exclusion rule, and ALG II has been increasingly granted.
3
German courts again turned to the ECJ to finally settle the issue. However, surprisingly, the 
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ECJ explicitly confirmed the German legislation denying EU jobseekers ALG II in the Dano
(C-333/13) and the Alimanovic (C-67/14) decisions. This was not the end of the story, 
however. In December 2015, the Bundessozialgericht, Germany’s highest social court, 
accepted the ECJ decision but argued that German constitutional law requires that every 
person in need residing in Germany for more than six months has access to Sozialhilfe.
4
 The 
German legislator and the administrations did not agree and managed to override the activist 
German courts. Reacting to the Bundessozialgericht’s decision to open social assistance for 
EU citizens, the competent social administration refused to implement this ruling. 
Interestingly, this refusal was backed by numerous lower social courts that openly dissented 
with their own high court, an unprecedented act in the history of German social jurisdiction.
5
To end this dispute and the legal limbo emanating from it, a law was eventually passed in 
December 2016 restoring the original legal situation.
6
 Non-working EU citizens without a 
work record or permanent residence right are again excluded from social assistance (ALG II 
and Sozialhilfe). 
Another instance of German courts pushing to open up non-contributory benefits for EU 
citizens occurred in 2010, when Germany’s highest tax court questioned that the refusal by 
German authorities to pay child allowance to seasonal workers whose children did not live in 
Germany was in accordance with EU law and asked the ECJ for clarification. In its Hudzinski
ruling (C-611/10), the ECJ agreed with the German court. In this case, the extension led to a 
significant increase of claims, causing additional costs of up to two billion euros until 2020 
according to the Federal Ministry of Finance.
7
 The consequences of the Hudzinski ruling (in 
combination with a recent general debate about ‘poverty migration’) spurred calls to limit EU 
citizens’ access to child benefits. However, little has occurred since then. Since 2015, EU 
citizens must have a tax ID for themselves and for their children to avoid double benefits, and 
the relevant authorities were initially instructed to grant child allowances to non-working EU 
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nationals on only a provisional basis. Further steps, especially an indexation of the child 
allowance for children of EU nationals living in a member state other than Germany, were 
discussed. Together with Denmark, Austria and Ireland, the German government now works 
to have child benefits indexed as part of the legislative reforms of Regulation 883/2004.
8
On a final note, it should be mentioned that the legal situation regarding study grants has 
provoked almost no reactions at all owing to the ECJ’s 2008 decision in Förster (C-158/07). 
In this case, the ECJ found that the exclusion of students from study grants during the first 
five years of their stay is consistent with EU law, thereby confirming the existing German 
rule. It was only recently that Germany had to adapt to EU law in this area. In 2013, the ECJ 
ruled in LN (C-46/12) that economically active EU students are eligible for study grants, 
thereby expanding the group of potential beneficiaries. The German legislator reacted 
immediately and adapted the existing rules accordingly. 
Overall, a rather restrictive reaction pattern has emerged in Germany. Although German 
courts attempted to further open non-contributory benefits for EU citizens, they were 
successful only to a limited extent due to the prevailing closure efforts of the German 
legislator and administrators. Thus, the underlying logic of reciprocity still generally prevails: 
EU nationals residing in Germany have access to tax-financed benefits only if they have 
somehow contributed to their funding by being workers or are integrated in Germany to a 
considerable degree by having lived in Germany for more than five years. 
Danish Responses  
Since the early 1970s negotiations on Danish membership in the European Community (EC), 
free movement for workers has been perceived as a fundamental challenge to the Danish 
welfare state. Entering a community of insurance-based welfare states, Denmark stood out as 
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an outlier with its universalism and tax-financed welfare benefits. As an EC member, the fear 
was that Denmark would attract migrant workers seeking to exploit the Danish social system 
(Rasmussen 2004, 304). Before Denmark became a member of the EC in 1973, welfare 
benefits were subject to Danish nationality and guarded by a principle of territoriality. For 
example, the Danish public pension was granted to all Danish citizens who had resided at 
least one year in Denmark. With EC membership, Denmark managed to negotiate a special 
Danish rule according to which pensioners must have resided 40 years in Denmark to be 
granted a full public pension (Rasmussen 2004, 300-313). 
As in Germany, the grand enlargement and expansive EU law were regarded as increasing the 
likelihood of European welfare migration. Benefits such as family benefits, social assistance 
and study grants were perceived as particularly problematic due to their non-contributory and 
relatively generous nature. The Danish responses, however, differ starkly from the German 
ones in judicial terms. EU citizens’ entitlements to these non-contributory benefits have not 
been addressed in Danish court cases, but social policy disputes have been addressed by the 
administrative, quasi-judicial social board of appeal. The appeal board has the competence to 
refer preliminary questions to the ECJ but very seldom does so. Concerning EU citizens’ right 
to Danish welfare benefits, this has only occurred once, in 2013 in a case on Danish study 
grant, LN (C-46/12). 
There are remarkably few principled administrative rulings on EU citizens’ entitlement to 
Danish welfare. We found only 26 principled administrative rulings regarding EU citizens’ 
entitlement to the three non-contributory benefits between 2003 and 2016. None of these 
rulings addressed family benefits, seven were concerned with social assistance and 19 with 





 and only two rulings granted study grants.
10
 The other rulings provided 
specifications on when to reject non-contributory benefits to EU nationals. 
Turning specifically to Danish responses regarding social assistance, job-seeking Union 
citizens who have not acquired worker status according to EU law are not entitled to Danish 
social assistance. In contrast to Germany, this administrative practice has not been challenged 
by Danish courts or in quasi-judicial proceedings. Therefore, the central Danish dispute 
concerned whether one is a worker. Worker status is dependent upon an individual assessment 
but normally requires at least 10-12 hours of work a week for a minimum of 10 weeks.
11
 In 
the political debate, the fact that EU citizens can assess the non-contributory social assistance 
scheme after only 10 weeks of work has been widely criticized. Fear of ‘welfare tourism’ has 
been broadly articulated in this regard.
12
 At the same time, a more restrictive administrative 
practice with respect to EU citizens’ entitlement to social assistance is identifiable. EU 
citizens’ entitlement to social assistance is decided by Danish municipalities. To be eligible 
for social assistance, one must be a legal resident with no other means to support oneself. The 
State Administration (Statsforvaltningen) ultimately determines a person’s right to residence. 
Administrative control of the right to reside and of the worker status of EU citizens has been 
tightened by formal instructions on at least two occasions. In 2009, the Ministry of Justice 
amended and specified the instructions to the State Administration regarding when an EU 
citizen’s status as a worker terminates. In 2014, the government adopted new control 
measures on EU citizens’ entitlement to social assistance, among other benefits. New 
guidelines were sent to the municipalities, which, among other measures, instructed the local 
caseworkers to intensify their control of worker status and work with the State Administration 
to decide on the scope of the right to residence when an EU citizen applies for social 
assistance. As a result, the administrative practice in the municipalities appears to have 
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become more restrictive. More municipalities now refuse applications for social assistance, 
and few EU citizens appeal such decisions.
13
Additionally, welfare-motivated migration has been much debated in relation to Danish child 
benefits. In 2010, the Danish Peoples Party (DPP) demanded, in exchange for support of the 
government’s budget proposal, that restrictions on EU citizens’ right to family benefits be 
adopted. The government initiated a reform process, mandating the executive to find a 
compromise between EU obligations and domestic politics. After testing different solutions 
and types of residence clauses, the Danish Parliament adopted a two-year residence clause for 
EU citizens to be eligible for full Danish family benefits taking effect from January 1, 2012. 
However, in July 2012, a German worker in Denmark complained about his unequal right to 
Danish child benefits. In the meantime, the Social-Democratic-led government had taken 
office in Denmark. The Commission sent an opening letter to the government. The Danish 
government decided to comply, and on June 18, 2013, the Ministry of Taxation announced 
that the residence clause would be waived for EU citizens. The legislative attempt to restrict 
access to Danish child benefits had been unsuccessful, and, as noted above, the Danish 
government instead aims for the indexation of child benefits. 
The preliminary question from the Danish appeal board in LN was the first of its kind in 
which the quasi-judicial authority decided to ask the ECJ for clarification on EU citizens’ 
right to Danish welfare. The ECJ responded that EU workers are entitled to the Danish study 
grant. There were numerous political and public reactions, and a large influx of EU students 
was feared.
14
 The Danish government responded by declaring that it would comply with the 
ruling.
15
 EU students enrolled in higher Danish education would now qualify for study grants 
if they were workers. However, some restrictive measures have been taken. The Danish 
government adopted a broad parliamentary agreement
16
 according to which national control 
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of EU students’ status as workers was tightened. Among other ‘safeguard’ mechanisms, the 
agreement ordered the Ministry of Higher Education to oversee the development and report 
back to the parliament. The responsible agency introduced an automatic search every three 
months among all EU citizens receiving study grants to determine whether the number of 
hours they worked or their salary had decreased. In such a case, their cases will be considered 
for individual assessment.
17
 Enhanced control has resulted in more than 1600 cases in which 
EU citizens had to return their study grants.
18
In summary, as in Germany, Danish responses have been restrictive. Danish courts have not 
been involved in pushing the rights of EU citizens to non-contributory benefits. In contrast, 
quasi-judicial proceedings have adopted a rather restrictive approach with respect to a large 
majority of the principled administrative rulings. Danish legislative and administrative 
responses demonstrate that EU law prevents certain options, such as residence clauses 
conditioning EU citizens’ entitlement to child benefits or denying EU workers enrolled in 
higher education study grants. However, while meanwhile some policy options are limited, 
scope for action is explored elsewhere. Tightened administrative control becomes the 
alternative response to fence off Danish welfare. 
Outcomes  
Our examination of outcomes began in 2007 and lasted until 2015. In 2007, the second 
eastern extension of the EU occurred with Romania and Bulgaria becoming Union members. 
As part of the accession agreement to the first eastern enlargement in 2004, member states 
were allowed to restrict free movement for a transitional period, first for two years and later 
for as much as seven years. The German transitional agreement was in effect for the full seven 
years until May 2011, whereas the Danish agreement was in effect for five years (i.e., until 
May 2009). The accession agreement regarding the 2007 enlargement adding Romania and 
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Bulgaria to the Union also allowed for transitional periods of up to seven years. Denmark had 
restrictions until May 2009. Germany continued some restrictions until December 31, 2013, 
albeit rather limited ones at the end of the seven-year period. Our studied period thus includes 
the period after the grand enlargements of 2004 and 2007 as well as the end of the transitional 
agreements to the free movement of persons in both Germany and Denmark. 
Comparing the stock and change of EU citizens residing in the old member states (i.e., EU-
15), we observe that all member states experienced a significant increase in the numbers of 
residing EU citizens during those years. 
[Table 3 here] 
For Germany and Denmark, it is clear that the right to free movement of EU citizens has had a 
considerable impact. By January 1, 2015, 3,475,500 EU citizens resided in Germany and 
173,200 resided in Denmark. From 2007 to 2015, the absolute numbers of EU citizens in 
Germany increased by more than 1 million, an increase of 41 percent. In Denmark, the 
increase in absolute numbers was 92,000, an even more notable relative increase of 113 
percent. 
In other words, Germany and Denmark have indeed been attractive locations of residence and 
work for EU citizens from other member states. We will now turn to the welfare outcomes of 
these developments in Germany and Denmark. 
Outcomes Germany  
Table 4 and Figure 1 below depict the absolute and relative numbers of all EU citizens of the 
respective year living in Germany and receiving minimum income benefits (Arbeitslosengeld 
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II or Sozialhilfe), child allowance (Kindergeld) and study grants (BAföG). Since ALG II is 
not only available for non-working persons but also for those who are economically active 
(such as in-work benefits), the numbers for ALG II have been disaggregated into these 
subgroups. The data for these calculations were obtained from Germany’s Federal Statistical 
Office and Federal Employment Office
19
 and provide the absolute numbers of EU recipients 
of the different benefit types at the end of each year of the time period covered. It is important 
to note that for the German data, it is impossible to calculate how many months a benefit was 
granted during a year. An EU citizen may have received the benefit for the entire year or only 
for one month and count among the absolute numbers of recipients. For both Germany and 
Denmark, Eurostat data were used to calculate the fraction of EU citizens receiving the 
respective benefits (see Table 3 above). 
Table 4 demonstrates that the increase of EU citizens residing in Germany is accompanied by 
a considerable increase in the absolute numbers regarding the use of non-contributory 
benefits. This seems to confirm that Germany is indeed experiencing a ‘welfare migration’ 
scenario. However, if these absolute numbers are considered in relation to the number of EU 
nationals residing in Germany, a different picture emerges. As the relative numbers in Table 4 
and Figure 1 demonstrate, we see that the fraction of EU citizens in Germany receiving child 
allowances or study grants remained quite stable over the time period investigated. We still 
see, however, a notable increase in the take-up rate of minimum income benefits. However, it 
is important to note that ALG II is granted not only to non-workers but also to workers in 
need. The largest increase occurs in ALG II granted as an in-work benefit. The number of EU 
citizens receiving this benefit increased from approximately 50,000 in 2007 to almost 125,000 
in 2015, an increase of more than 150 percent in absolute terms and almost 80 percent in 
relative terms. In comparison, the fraction of non-working EU citizens receiving ALG II or 
Sozialhilfe grew more modestly to 27 percent and 37.2 percent, respectively, in relative terms. 
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Comparing EU citizens’ take-up rate of minimum income benefits with their take-up rate of 
the much more attractive unemployment insurance benefit brings this further into perspective. 
In 2007, the absolute number of EU citizens receiving the regular unemployment insurance 
benefit was 41,440 (1.7% of the EU population in Germany). In 2015, 52,966 EU citizens 
received unemployment insurance benefits (1.5% of the EU population).Thus, in contrast to 
the more residual form of minimum income benefits, we here see a relative decrease of 9.3 
percent over time. This finding suggests that the dualized German labour market leads to a 
bifurcation of EU citizens’ social protection. EU workers with atypical or irregular jobs 
experience a growing welfare dependency on more residual income benefits while largely 
being excluded from the benefits of the welfare state core.  
[Figure 1 here] 
[Table 4 here] 
In summary, the rising number of EU citizens living in Germany is partly accompanied by an 
increase in EU citizens’ take-up rate of minimum income benefits. However, it is questionable 
to what extent this marks a welfare magnet effect. Since all minimum income benefit claims 
depend on worker status or long-term residency, the increase is unlikely to be caused by 
welfare-seeking migration but instead by the poor labour market integration of an increasing 
part of the EU citizens living in Germany. This suggestion is especially supported by the high 
increase in the take-up rate of ALG II as an in-work-benefit. EU citizens move to Germany to 
work, but if they take atypical or irregular jobs, there is a greater likelihood that they will earn 
incomes below the German subsistence level or a greater likelihood of temporary 
unemployment. Compared with EU citizens’ low take-up rate of the more generous 
unemployment insurance benefits, this suggests a tendency towards a bifurcated social 
20 

protection system for EU citizens at the margins of the labour market with limited access to 
the core of the welfare state.    
Outcomes Denmark  
For the analysis of Denmark, Figure 2 and Table 5 below depict the absolute numbers and 
proportion of EU citizens residing in Denmark receiving family benefits, study grants and 
social assistance at least 26 weeks a year (not necessarily consecutively). The data were 
collected from the Danish register data, which is a unique source of administrative data that 
researchers can access upon application. Our dataset includes repeated cross-sections of the 
total population of EU citizens residing in Denmark on December 31 of each year during the 
examined time period.
20
 We then examine the consumption of the three non-contributory 
benefits in the current year when granted at least 26 weeks. For family benefits, we were only 
able to compile information to 2014. 
Figure 2 below shows that the percentage of EU citizens receiving family benefits was far 
higher than the percentage receiving study grants and social assistance. Family benefits are 
granted to workers as well as non-workers. Students can have additional income as workers, 
whereas for social assistance recipients, the benefit is the only source of income. This implies 
that those receiving family benefits and study grants are also potential taxpayers. Table 5 
below presents the absolute and relative numbers of EU citizens receiving non-contributory 
benefits by January 1, 2007, compared to January 1, 2015, except for family benefits, for 
which we only have information up to January 1, 2014. The absolute numbers grew within the 
examined period for all three benefits. However, as shown above, the number of EU citizens 
residing in Denmark also increased considerably within the same period. Thus, when we 
examine the relative numbers, we see that the take-up rate decreased slightly for family 
benefits and social assistance but increased for study grants. To compare with the German 
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case, we should also note that in 2007, 2057 EU citizens in Denmark received the more 
generous contribution-based unemployment benefits (2.5% of the EU population in 
Denmark). In 2013
21
, the absolute number had increased to 6172 EU recipients (3.9% of the 
EU population). For study grants, the increase is most notable after 2013, which is mainly 
explained by the ECJ judgement LN of that year. In a report from May 2016, the Danish 
Ministry for Higher Education and Science evaluated the impact of the judgement, noting that 
the number of EU citizens receiving study grants as a result of the ECJ case rose from 1345 
students in 2013 to 4484 students in 2015. In 2015, the costs of study grants paid to EU 
workers amounted to 319 million DKK. However, it is notable that 319 million DKK 
accounts for a rather modest 1.5 percent of the total Danish study grant costs of 21.5 billion 
DKK.  
[Figure 2 here]
[Table 5 here]  
In summary, despite the significant increase of EU citizens in Denmark as well as the 
extended rights to cross-border welfare, we find no general corresponding increase in EU 
citizens’ take-up rate of non-contributory benefits. We also do not find the same tendency to a 
bifurcated social protection system as in Germany, but instead noted a higher number of EU 
citizens receiving unemployment insurance benefits than social assistance. This suggests that 
in the Danish case, EU citizens are more socially integrated into the core of the welfare state 




Since 2004, the European Union’s dually free movement system has undergone a period of 
dramatic changes with grand enlargements, increased socio-economic heterogeneity and the 
extension of EU rules and rights to a much broader population. These changes have caused 
grave political and public concerns regarding their welfare-state impacts, leading to 
theoretically supported fears that some member states will become welfare magnets to the 
European poor. The relatively generous and tax-financed welfare state of Denmark is a most 
likely case to confirm or refute the welfare magnet hypothesis. 
In this paper, we compared how two different welfare states responded to the dually open free 
movement system in the EU and the outcomes thereof. In both member states, we found that 
extension of EU rules and rights were responded to rather restrictively. Today, non-working 
EU citizens with no work record or without permanent residence are largely excluded from 
minimum income benefits in both member states. In addition, both member states are, albeit 
to different degrees, have developed alternative options, by means of legislative actions or 
tightened administrative control, to further fence off their welfare systems.  However, there 
have also been noteworthy differences in the domestic reactions of Germany and Denmark. 
The German judiciary has traditionally been much more active than its institutional 
counterpart in Denmark due to the higher degree of judicial specialization and a specific court 
branch that deals exclusively with social issues and has traditionally perceived itself as the 
defender of socially disadvantaged individuals against an omnipotent state (Tabbara 2009). 
However, the judicial venue for extending social rights to the non-economically active EU 
citizen has recently been pushed back by the German legislator and administrators and by 
lower social courts that have openly dissented with their own high court. An unprecedented 
situation in the history of German social jurisdiction has thus emerged in which domestic 
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courts, administrations and the legislator debate where to draw the boundaries of a 
Europeanised welfare state.  
With regard to outcomes, our analysis does not support the welfare magnet hypothesis. 
Comparing the two countries, EU citizens’ take up a higher rate of non-contributory welfare 
benefits in Germany than in Denmark. In addition, apart from ALG II in Germany we do not 
find an increase over time in the take-up rate of the examined benefits within the two 
countries. However, the comparison did find notable institutional differences.  
The fraction of EU citizens receiving family benefits and social assistance decreased in 
Denmark, whereas the fraction of EU citizens receiving study grants increased. However, in 
2015, the costs of paying study grants to EU citizens in Denmark amounted to only 1.5 
percent of the total national costs. In Germany, we see a rather stable pattern in the fraction of 
EU citizens receiving family benefits and study grants. However, at the same time, we 
identify a notable increase in EU citizens’ take-up rate of in-work-benefits, suggesting a 
particular challenge to welfare state schemes that support low-wage labour. At the same time, 
we see a tendency to bifurcation of EU citizens’ social protection in Germany with notable 
few granted the more generous unemployment insurance benefits. 
In conclusion, our findings cannot support the welfare magnet hypothesis. The Danish welfare 
state is currently the ‘purest’ type of the tax-financed, Nordic welfare state, a welfare haven to 
which one would want to migrate if the welfare magnet hypothesis were indeed true. 
However, this is not the case. Despite a dually open free movement system and a decade of 
paramount changes, there is no considerable increase in EU citizens’ take-up rate of non-
contributory benefits in Denmark, nor do we find such an increase in Germany. What we do 
see in Germany is that more EU citizens are in need of in-work benefits to supplement their 
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low-income jobs to maintain a sustainable living. Such low-wage sectors do not yet exist in 
Denmark (Hassel, Steen Knudsen, and Wagner 2016), nor do income support schemes. Rather 
than using welfare state types to explain the outcomes of EU rules, the interplay between 
labour markets and welfare schemes may better account for different outcomes. The 
dualization of the German labour market increases the number of workers whose income must 
be supplemented by welfare benefits to make a living (Thelen 2014; Vandenbroucke 2016). 
Thus, instead of welfare magnetism, our findings identified a tendency to a bifurcated social 
protection system for EU citizens in Germany, situated at the margin of the labour market and 
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Tables & Figures 
Table 1: Socio-economic heterogeneity in the European Union (2015) 
Member State GDP per capita in 
PPS 
(EU-27 = 100) 
Social protection 
expenditure 
(in % of GDP) 
Social 
contributions 
(as % of total 
social protection 
receipts) 
Belgium 118 29,1 60,3 
Bulgaria 47 17,3 50,8 
Czech Republic 87 18,6 71,6 
Denmark 126 31,1 18,1 
Germany 124 28 64,7 
Estonia 75 16,2 79,4 
Ireland 176 15,6 39,2 
Greece 68 26,1 54,7 
Spain 89 24,3 54,3 
France 106 32 61,1 
Italy 96 28,9 49,5 
Cyprus 81 21,5 46,1 
Latvia 64 14,6 58,1 
Lithuania 74 14,8 72,8 
Luxembourg 268 21,6 50,4 
Hungary 68 19,9 63,6 
Malta 92 17,3 39,8 
Netherlands 128 28,4 62,3 
Austria 127 29,4 62,5 
Poland 68 18,7 62,7 
Portugal 76 24,8 45,1 
Romania 57 14,3 45,1 
Slovenia 82 23,5 66,4 
Slovakia 77 17,8 67,9 
Finland 109 31,1 47,7 
Sweden 123 28,7 47,2 
United Kingdom 108 28,6 40,1 
Source: All data are compiled from the Eurostat database (data files prc_ppp_ind,une_rt_a, spr_exp_sum and spr_rec_sumt). 
Data for Poland in columns 2 and 3 are from 2014due to unavailability of data for 2015. 
Table 2: Level of generosity of non-contributory benefits in Germany and Denmark (2017)
Germany Denmark 
Minimum income benefits 
€409 for persons living alone or 
for single parents. Coverage of 
‘appropriate’ housing and 
heating costs. ‘Appropriateness’ 
decided by local authorities. 
€1,498 for persons of 30 years or 
more without children; 
approximately €1,900 for 
persons with at least one child. 
Housing and other supplements 
possible, based on needs 
Child benefits  
1st child and 2nd child €192 per 
child. 3rd child: €198, 4th child: 
€223. No graduation by age. 
Approximately €162 per child. 
Graduation by age. 
Study grants  Maximum rate €735  Approximately €800 
Source: MISSOC comparative tables database, SU.dk and Studentenwerke.de, accessed December 2017. 
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Table 3: Share of Foreign EU citizens in the EU-15 countries
2007 
(thousands) 
% pop 2015 
(thousands)
% pop Change 
(thousands)
% change 
Belgium 632,2 5,97 852,3 7,60 220,0 35 
Denmark 81,2 1,49 173,2 3,06 92,0 113 
Germany 2.467,2 2,99 3.475,5 4,28 1.008, 3 41 
Ireland 351,9 8,10 368,6 7,96 16,7 5 
Greece 157,7 1,41 198,7 1,83 41,0 26 
Spain 1.634,6 3,65 1.948,4 4,19 313,8 19 
France 1.299,0 2,04 1.487,4 2,23 188,3 14 
Italy 606,2 1,03 1.491,9 2,45 885,7 146 
Luxembourg 170,9 35,89 222,2 39,46 51,3 30 
Netherlands 244,9 1,49 430,9 2,54 186,0 76 
Austria 263,2 3,18 565,4 6,59 302,2 115 
Portugal 95,6 0,90 100,4 0,96 4,9 5 
Finland 42,5 0,80 90,2 1,64 47,7 112 
Sweden 225,5 2,47 296,0 3,03 70,5 31 
United 
Kingdom 
1.456,9 2,39 2.988,3 4,60 1.531,4 105 
Source: Data are compiled on the basis of the Eurostat’s database with the source code ‘migr_pop1ctz’. The numbers are the 
EU population in the respective countries as of January 1st of the noted year.  
Table 4 Non-contributory recipients (EU) in DE in absolute numbers and as percentages of 
the EU population residing in DE  
Recipients 2007 % EU population  2015 % EU population  
Child allowance 332.752 13,49 510.107 14,68  
 Minimum income benefits      
ALG II (non-working) 172.655 7,00 308.901 8,89 
ALG II (in-work) 49.524 2,01 124.533 3,58 
Sozialhilfe 15.961 0,65 28.233* 0,81 
 Study grants 5.671 0,23 7.834 0,23  
*for Sozialhilfe the ultimate year is 2014 due to unavailability of data for 2015. 
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Table 5: Non-contributory recipients in DK in absolute numbers and as percentages of the 
EU population residing in DK  
Recipients 2007 % EU population  2015 % EU population  
Family benefits  12339 15,19 23613* 14,76* 
Study grants  3438 4.23 11290 6.52  
Social assistance 2164 2,66 3354 1,94  
* for family benefits the ultimate year is 2014 due to unavailability of data for 2015. 
Figure 1 Proportion of EU citizens receiving non-contributory benefits among EU citizens 
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Figure 2: Proportion of EU citizens receiving non-contributory benefits in DK among EU 
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